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Abstract 
  
Two alternative measures of demand adjusted capital input for the U.S. non-farm private business sector 
are derived and their differential impacts on the potential supply of output are compared to those obtained 
using the unadjusted index of capital input published by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). The re-
sults show that, allowing for the demand pressure on the fixed assets of firms, leads to three effects. It 
raises the level of estimated potential output well above CBO’s estimates; with the exception of the 1990s, 
the estimated growth rates turn out to be higher than those computed by CBO; and, lastly, the long term 
trend of the growth rates with and without the demand adjustment to the capital input is sloping down-
wards. The latter finding was not unexpected since aggregate demand, as reflected in the utilization rate of 
fixed assets by firms, has been trending downwards throughout the postwar period. Drawing on these find-
ings it is concluded that the path to secular stagnation that the U.S. economy is following in the postwar 
period is not due solely to headwinds on the supply side. To some degree, perhaps significant, the deceler-
ation in the expansion of productive capacity as well as in the intensity of its utilization is due to the de-
clining long term aggregate demand.  
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1. Introduction 
The term output, with or without further qualification, is used to connote different things. For an 
example, consider the expression potential output. A cursory search in the relevant literature re-
veals that some use it to imply the highest level of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) that can be pro-
duced with a given mix of available resources and institutions; some others to signify the highest 
level of GDP that can be sustained over the long term; and still some others to denote the GDP that 
can be produced by an economy if all its resources are fully employed. This paper employs the fol-
lowing three definitions. The first of them is employed by the Congressional Budget Office (2001, 
1) to estimate past and future growth rates of “maximum sustainable GDP consistent with a stable 
rate of inflation”. In particular, as they explain in pages 8-9 of this publication, the approach by 
which they pursue this task is based on the Cobb-Douglas production function: 
1
1t t t tQ AL K
 
 ,                                                               (1) 
Potential output—the trend growth in the productive capacity of the economy—
is an estimate of the level of real GDP attainable when the economy is operating 
at a high rate of resource use. It is not a technical ceiling on output that cannot be 
exceeded. Rather, it is a measure of maximum sustainable output—the level of 
real GDP in a given year that is consistent with a stable rate of inflation.  
 
Output supply is the value of goods and services produced within a certain period, 
say a quarter or a year. It corresponds to the real GDP reported in the National In-
come and Product Accounts (NIPA). If output supply rises above potential output, 
constraints on productive capacity begin to bind, inflationary pressures build, and 
firms react by raising the utilization of their fixed assets. On the contrary, if output 
supply falls below potential output, resources are lying idle, inflationary pressures 
abate, and firms react by reducing the utilization of their fixed assets.  
 
Output demand is the value of goods and services sold by firms for purposes of 
consumption and investment. It corresponds to real GDP plus the change in the 
inventories of raw materials and intermediate and finished goods. If output de-
mand exceeds (falls short of) output supply, inventories decline (expand), price 
pressures build (abate), and for some time output supply increases (declines) 
mainly through adjustments by firms in the utilization of their fixed assets. How-
ever, over the longer run, and depending on whether the changes in output de-
mand are perceived as permanent or transitory, firms may expand (shrink) pro-
ductive capacity, and hence potential supply of output, by accelerating invest-
ment in or retirement of fixed assets, respectively.  
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where the symbols are defined as follows: tQ = real GDP in year t; tL = billion hours worked in 
year t; 1tK  = real value of the capital stock in year t-1; tA  = Total Factor Productivity (TFP) in 
year t; and the parameter   stands for the income share of capital in the value of output.  
Transforming (1) into logarithmic form, differentiating totally the resulting expression, and 
setting 0.3   on account of the evidence that the payments to owners of capital have averaged 
roughly 30 percent of total U.S. income since 1947, yields:  
10 7 0 3t t t t% Q % A . % L . % K         .                                             (2)  
This equation states that the growth rate of GDP equals the growth rate of TFP plus the weighted 
average of the growth rates of labor and capital; Or, to express it in a way indicating that TFP is 
computed as a residual, the growth rate of tA  is equal to the growth rate of tQ  not accounted for 
by the weighted average of the growth rates of  and t tL K .  
Equation (2) holds generally. That is, it holds for any period, any value of , and any dis-
aggregation, definition and measurement of the variables involved. Thus, by redefining it as:   
1% % 0.7 % 0.3 %
p p p p
t t t tQ A L K         ,                                         (3) 
where the upper index p denotes the “potential” values of the variables, the researchers of the 
Congressional Budget Office (henceforth CBO) proceed in two steps. In the first step, using (2) 
in conjunction with data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), for the variables 
 and t tQ K , and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), for the variable tL , they compute the 
growth rates of tA  going back to 1949. Past values vary due to both regular and irregular factors. 
Therefore, to obtain the growth rates  %  and %
p p
t tL A  , the variables tL  and tA  are purged from 
their cyclical components by taking their centered five year moving average. As for the growth 
rate %
p
tK , they obtain it by setting 1 1
p
t tK K    on account of the rationalization that: 
 “…, the capital input does not need to be cyclically adjusted to create a “poten-
tial” level—the unadjusted capital input already represents its potential contri-
bution to output. Although use of the capital stock varies greatly during the busi-
ness cycle, the potential flow of capital services will always be related to the to-
tal size of the capital stock, not to the amount currently being used.” 
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Lastly, upon inserting 1% ,  %  and %
p p p
t t tA L K     into (3), they obtain the trend growth rate 
% ptQ as a weighted sum of the trend growth rates of labor and capital services plus the trend 
growth rate in TFP.  
Table A1 in the Appendix
1
 presents the time series of real GDP as a measure of output ( tQ ), the 
labor ( tL ) and capital ( 1tK  ) inputs, and labor productivity ( /t tQ L ). These constitute the series re-
ported in the sources mentioned at the bottom of the table. Table A2 reports the most recent esti-
mates and projections by CBO of potential output ( ptQ ) and its determinants. In the latter table the 
rows 1949-2016 refer to the historical estimates, whereas the rows 2017-2027 exhibit those that are 
projected. Finally, in line with the preceding remark, according to which they set 1 1
p
t tK K  , the se-
ries of capital input reported by CBO is the same in both tables.  
In Bitros (2019a) the above analytical framework was adapted and applied in conjunction with 
data for the U.S. nonfarm private business sector to investigate the linkages between capital input 
and potential output over the period 1949-2016. More specifically, by focusing on the changes in 
the composition of the capital stock in terms of structures, equipment and intangibles,  average 
service lives, and relative prices of producer’s to consumer’s goods, that paper allowed for their 
influence on the capital input and traced the latter’s effects on potential output. From the results it 
emerged that when the capital input is revised to reflect all these changes in the capital stock, the 
potential supply of output decelerates even faster than suggested by CBO’s estimates and as a 
result the real economy in the years following the 2007 financial crisis appears to have adjusted 
to its lower potential faster than the protagonists of the secular stagnation hypothesis have sug-
gested. But in as much as the deceleration of potential output is an undesirable development, it 
may not be due exclusively to the supply side headwinds discussed in that paper, since it may 
have trended downwards due also to slowing aggregate demand.  
Thus, the focus in the present paper is to highlight the possible linkages of potential output sup-
ply to influences that may emanate from the demand side of the economy. To this effect, Section 2 
lays out the model which is employed in the empirical part. This task is accomplished by expanding 
along the lines pursued in Bitros (2019a). In particular, the adjustments in the capital input adopted 
there are taken a step further to allow for the changes in the intensity of the utilization of fixed as-
                                                     
1
 Numbers of tables in the Appendix are preceded by letter A.  
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sets, drawing on the conceptualization that they associate closely with the changes in aggregate 
output demand.  Section 3 comments on the proxy variable used to capture the effects of changes in 
aggregate demand that are channeled to the potential supply of output through the capital input.  
Given that the main body of the data used in the calculations coincides with those presented in the 
aforementioned study, the emphasis in this section is placed mainly on the issues regarding the def-
inition, measurement and data sources of the utilization rate. Section 4 reports on the results and 
their possible significance and policy implications; and lastly, Section 5 closes with a summary of 
the main findings and conclusions. 
2.  Linking potential supply and demand for output 
Let us go back to equation (2) and redefine it so as to explain the percentage growth rate of out-
put supply in the light of the adjustments made to the capital input in Bitros (2019a): 
  
10 7 0 3t t t t
ˆ% Q % A . % L . % K .                                                     (4) 
 
From the definition it follows that the left side of (4) stands for the percentage growth rate of real 
GDP produced and supplied in any given period. As for the right side, this shows the contribu-
tions from three sources. Namely, the labor input, which corresponds to the percentage rate of 
change in the hours worked by workers, times 0.7; TFP, which is reckoned as a residual; and the 
percentage rate of change in the supply of the capital input times 0.3. The new element is the cap-
ital input, labeled
1
ˆ
tK  , which signifies that the capital stock has been adjusted for changes in: (a) 
its composition in terms of structures, equipment and intangibles, (b) the average service lives of 
these producer’s goods, and (c) their prices relative to consumer’s goods. 
 In view of its treatment by CBO, the quantity of capital services used may or may not coincide 
with their available supply. The term 
1t
ˆ% K   in (4) stands for the percentage rate of change in 
the maximum available supply of the capital input. It is an upper limit that cannot be exceeded. 
But how much of it is utilized in the production process period in-period out depends on the de-
mand for output. Therefore, to obtain an approximate measure of the capital input used by firms, 
a convenient approach is to introduce the utilization rate ( tu ) of fixed assets, which measures the 
percentage of available productive capacity utilized at time t. More specifically, we propose to set 
1 1 1t t t
ˆK u K ,   where 1tK   denotes the amount of capital services used for the production of the 
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aggregate output demanded. Thus, on account of this conceptualization, we may redefine (4) as in 
(5) below: 
   
10 7 0 3t t t t% Q % A . % L . % K .                                               (5) 
 
Observe that in this specification we have changed the symbol tA to tA . We have done so to indicate 
that the percentage rate of change of TFP corresponds to the revised definition and measurement of capital 
services. Finally, expressing (5) in terms of the potential values of the variables yields: 
 
10 7 0 3
p p p p
t t t t% Q % A . % L . % K .                                               (6) 
 
Now the differences between (3) and (6) are quite fundamental both from a theoretical and an 
empirical standpoint. Adopting the view that the available quantity of capital services represents 
their potential contribution to output, in essence CBO’s researchers maintain that the rate of po-
tential economic growth is unrelated to capacity utilization. More specifically, even though they 
do not state it explicitly, they reason that while in the short run capacity utilization may affect the 
rate of economic growth due to price and other rigidities, in the long run the adjustments that take 
place in the economy render its influence irrelevant. Yet, numerous macroeconomic theorists 
have argued that the intensity with which firms use their fixed assets is too important to be ig-
nored in the study of economic growth on at least three grounds. The first, emanating from a 
lengthy literature that includes contributions for example by Calvo (1975), Hulten (1986), Wen 
(1998) and Chatterjee (2005), establishes that capacity utilization relates positively to economic 
growth through the productivity channel. To see this linkage, assume that because of conditions 
that are inherent in production technologies, up to a point increases in capacity utilization raise 
productivity, whereas further increases thereafter lead to production bottlenecks and productivity 
declines. Under these circumstances the marginal cost of capacity utilization in terms of produc-
tive efficiency would not be zero and firms might have good economic reasons to use their fixed 
assets at less than full capacity even in the long run. But then applying (3) would result in overes-
timation of the rate of potential economic growth because implicit in this equation is the assump-
tion that the marginal cost of capacity utilization is zero, which implies that firms operate their 
installations always at full capacity.  
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Unlike the productivity channel, which works through the supply side, the second ground for 
taking into account the linkage between capacity utilization and economic growth stems from a 
strand of literature that places sole emphasis on the demand side of the economy. Keynes (1936) 
was the first to point towards this direction. But his interest was in the study of the short run im-
plications of aggregate demand and it was left to Harrod (1939), Khan (1959), Robinson (1962) 
and Kalecki (1971) to develop insightful dynamic models of the long run. Central to them all, as 
well as to the models presented more recently by researchers working in the their tradition, like 
for example Dutt (2006), Dutt, Ross (2007) and Shaikh (2009), is the role of capacity utilization 
as a channel of the influences from changes in aggregate demand to economic growth. Just to 
sketch the mechanism they envision to be at work, assume that we observe a very simple Keynes-
Kalecki economy with the following characteristics: 
 Each unit of capital stock tK is operated by one unit of labor tL ;  
 The capital stock is operated with intensityu , and hence the quantity of output pro-
duced tY  is equal to tuK ;  
 The total output is distributed in the form of wages twL and profits trK , where  and w r  
stand for the wage rate and the profit rate, respectively;
2
  
 While workers consume all of their income, profit earners save some proportion s ;  
 Profit earners invest their savings so that t tS srK  is always equal to investment tI .  
Now in this economy let the central bank reduce the discount rate to stimulate economic activity 
and combat unemployment. How might this policy influence economic growth and what might 
be the role in this regard of the utilization rateu ?  
 The reduction in the discount rate would certainly encourage some firms to bring forward their 
investment plans. As a result, investment would be expected to accelerate. Assume that the new 
higher level of planned investment is 
*
tI  and that the new higher level of the capital stock con-
sistent with this investment is
*
tK .  In turn, with u  given, the planned supply of output will rise to 
a new higher level, say
*
tY , and the same will happen to profits. Over time the share of profits will 
increase enough so that the savings by profit earners will come to rest at the higher planned level 
                                                     
2
 It should be noted that the term “profits” corresponds to “income” from capital. In the long run and under competi-
tive conditions the latter is the product of the normal return on capital r  times the quantity of capital stock tK .  
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of investment where we will have * *t tS I . From this analysis it follows that the reduction in the 
central bank discount rate motivates stimulation of aggregate demand by raising the level of 
planned investment and boosting economic growth. By how much it depends on the utilization rate
u , which in this case is held constant. However, having demonstrated the mechanism through 
which it works, it should not come as a surprise that according to this key model “demand creates 
its own supply”, i.e. the opposite of Say’s Law on which CBO’s approach is based.  
 Could thinking along these lines offer some clues to the situation that emerged in the U.S. af-
ter the 2009 financial crisis? For this particular period CBO revised downwards its estimates of 
potential output by 5% due largely to reduced labor and capital inputs. But the Federal Reserve 
authorities could not do much because the policy interest rate had been reduced already closed to 
zero, so investment could not be stimulated through this channel. As a result many wandered: 
Could the reduction in the capital and labor inputs be due to the lack of demand and not of sup-
ply? Some world renowned economists thought that this might be the case and suggested policy 
initiatives to stimulate aggregate demand. For an example, consider Summers (2014a). Having 
returned to this question again and again since Summers (2013), in page 71 of this paper he an-
swers by stating:     
We are seeing very powerfully a kind of inverse Say’s Law. Say’s Law was the 
proposition that supply creates its own demand. Here, we are observing that lack 
of demand creates its own lack of supply.  
and in page 72 he goes on to recommend, among several other policies, that: 
The preferable strategy, I would argue, is to raise the level of demand at any giv-
en rate of interest—raising the level of output consistent with an increased level 
of equilibrium rates and mitigating the various risks associated with low interest 
rates that I have described. 
Yet, perhaps because at the time the U.S. Economy was on its way back to meaningful rates of 
economic growth, shortly thereafter Summers (2014b) moved away from his emphasis on the 
lack of aggregate demand and in the direction of researchers who stress the lack of supply by ex-
panding on Gordon’s (2014) headwinds that forestall it.  
In the meantime, even though the acrimonies between supply-siders and demand-siders ap-
peared to have subsided, that debate was not in vain because it revealed in a forceful way the 
need for a unified analytical framework in which aggregate supply and demand for output would 
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be given proper weight. The relevant literature is not void in this quest; Slowly and rather quietly 
research in this direction has made considerable progress. Although these efforts started some-
what earlier than the breakout of the financial crisis in 2009, three notable contributions since 
then are the ones by Dutt (2010), Ferri et al (2011) and Fazzari et al. (2013). If one has to single 
out only one common element in the models they present, this is none other than capacity utiliza-
tion. That is why they provide even stronger support than the two grounds we invoked above to 
justify the introduction into (3) aggregate demand considerations through this channel. 
To conclude this summary into the theoretical and empirical reasons that warrant the applica-
tion of (3) in the form of (6), we find it least creative to take sides as to whether in any period and 
under any circumstances Say’s Law holds sway directly or inversely. In our view in market 
economies with private ownership of the means of production economic growth is spearheaded 
other times by supply and other times by demand. So adopting a framework of analysis in which 
both are allowed to drive the course of potential output is prudent and may prove highly reward-
ing in terms of explanatory power.      
3. Capacity utilization and potential capital input 
Regarding the utilization of productive capacity in the U.S, the database maintained by the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of St’ Louis provides time series at various sectoral levels. The one most rele-
vant to this research is the index labelled “total capacity utilization”. But this index goes back on-
ly to 1966 and, in as much as we searched for alternative sources of information that might ena-
ble us to extend it backwards to match the CBO historical statistics, i.e. to 1949, it proved impos-
sible. For this reason, we adopted the following procedure. The same database reports an index 
labelled “manufacturing capacity utilization” which goes back to 1947. Thus, assuming that total 
economic activity correlates strongly with the activity in the manufacturing sector, we regressed the 
index of total economy capacity utilization ( ttcu ) on the index of manufacturing capacity utiliza-
tion ( tmcu ) and obtained the following equation:
3
  
2
             12 295 0 862
                       (9 73)    (53.9)
 0 981  (1,49)=2903.9, ( )=0.0000
t ttcu . . mcu
.
R . , F P F
 

                                  (7) 
                                                     
3
 In this equation the figures underneath the parameter estimates stand for the t-statistic, 
2R  is the adjusted coeffi-
cient of determination, and the standard criteria  and F P  ascertain the statistical significance of the equation. 
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With its help we then extended the index ttcu back to 1949. These series are displayed in Figure 
1. Observe that over the period 1966-2016 the index tmcu tracks ttcu exceedingly well. By impli-
cation, the strong fit of equation (7) ascertains that using it to project the series of total economy 
capacity utilization back to 1949 should not involve significant errors of measurement. How suc-
cessfully this procedure performs is corroborated by the tight tracking of the solid line by the dot-
ted extension of the dashed line.   
Looking closer at this figure several significant observations come to mind. One, and perhaps 
most striking, is that with the exception of 1952 and 1965, which were war years for the U.S., the 
capacity utilization since 1949 never exceeded 87%. Actually, excluding the years of the Korean 
and Vietnam wars, the capacity utilization over the period 1949-2016 averaged 81.4%, whereas if 
we split the years into before and after 1980, the average declined from 83.4% in the first period 
to 79.0% in the second. From this evidence it follows that as a rule, when firms build productive 
facilities they never plan to use them fully. For technical, but also for reasons that are inherent to 
their economic calculus, firms build installations with the intention to use them at some “normal” 
intensity, leaving some slack capacity as buffer to adjust promptly to unexpected contingencies 
that develop because of shifts in demand, and not only. However, there is no way of knowing 
what this “normal” capacity utilization may be and hence, in order to measure the demand pres-
sure on the fixed assets of firms, a possible way out is to assume that the “normal” is indicated by 
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the two lowest historical values in the abridged series of capital utilization,  draw a straight line 
through them, construct an index of relative demand pressure by drawing on the deviations of 
total capacity utilization from the calculated straight line, and lastly, use this index of demand 
pressure to compute a demand adjusted series of the capital input.    
A second observation is that the time trend of capacity utilization is negative. Why is this so? 
From Bitros (2019a) we know that the composition of the capital stock has been changing all 
these decades in favor of equipment and intangibles and against infrastructures. Could this shift 
have anything to do with the long term decline in the capacity utilization? Infrastructural invest-
ments are generally more discrete and experience higher degrees of duplication than machinery 
and software. So the decline in their share in the capital stock would be expected to increase, not 
reduce capacity utilization. And the same is true with the advancement in automation which tends 
to favor relatively more the equipment part of the capital stock rather than that of infrastructure.   
Hence, even though we could not find hard evidence in this regard, most a priori considerations 
indicate that the culprit in the long term decline of capacity utilization may be associated with the 
decline in aggregate demand. Moreover, given that during the same period productive capacity as 
indexed by the ratio of net investment to the capital stock trended downwards at least in manufac-
turing,
4
 the likelihood that both productive capacity and its utilization trended downwards mainly 
because of slackening aggregate demand does not seem baseless. But then capacity utilization 
influences potential capital input systematically and hence it should be treated as such by placing 
emphasis on the demand adjusted series of potential capital input. 
Lastly, notice that capacity utilization traces two cycles. One that moves upwards from the 
middle of the 1950s and ends in a trough around 1980 and another that turns again upwards 
around the 1980s, reaches an apex in the middle of the 1990s, and since then it has been declin-
ing. These cycles are very lengthy and don’t have much in common with the forces that drive the 
normal business cycles in the U.S. economy. Rather they are associated with protracted swings in 
production technologies and shifting consumer tastes, income distribution and economic policies. 
By implication, failing to account for the effects of relative demand pressure, channeled to poten-
tial capital input through capacity utilization, may introduce systematic biases into the estimates 
of potential output. To highlight this possibility, we carried out two separate calculations of the de-
                                                     
4
 See Figure 17-6 in Gordon (2015, 399). 
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mand adjusted potential capital input: One based on CBO’s capital input index 1tK  and another 
based of the capital input 
1
ˆ
tK   derived in Bitros (2019a). Both these series are shown in Columns (1) 
and (2) of Table A4. In turn, the series 
1 1
ˆ and  t tK K   were multiplied by the index of relative de-
mand pressure  trdp  shown in Column (3), and their five year centered moving average series are report-
ed under the symbols 1 1 and  t tK K   in Columns (4) and (5), respectively. 
  Figure 2 displays the graphs of the series 1 1 1 1 and 
P p p
t t t tK K ,K K    . Observe that the graph of 
1
p
tK  lies above that of 1 
p
tK  throughout the period under consideration, whereas the graph of 1
p
tK 
crosses the latter from below beginning in the 1990s. Therefore, by ignoring the influences of aggre-
gate demand that are channeled to aggregate supply through the utilization rate, the deceleration 
in recent years of potential output, and hence of economic growth, may have been less ominous 
than perceived by supply-siders. The objective of the presentation in the next section is to shed 
some light on this particular issue.  
4. Potential output under alternative demand adjusted measures of capital input  
The series of actual and potential output reported by CBO are shown in Columns (1) of Tables 
A1 and A2, respectively. For convenience we transferred both of them in Columns (1) and (2) of 
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Table A5. As indicated earlier, CBO researchers have computed the series of potential output us-
ing in equation (3) the convention that 1 1
p
t tK K  . However, above we argued in support of the 
indices 1 1 and t tK K   to account for the influences of aggregate demand via the channel of the utili-
zation rate. Therefore the remaining task is to compute equation (6) under the alternative demand 
adjusted measures of potential capital input and assess the differences. Notice that in (7a) below we 
have changed the symbol % ptQ to%
p
tQ . We have done so for two reasons: First, to indicate that 
applying this equation to the data reported by CBO does not give exactly their figures for potential out-
put; and secondly, to hold the method of computation the same across all three equations. 
   
1
1
1
0 7 0 3       (a)
0 7 0 3       (b)
0 7 0 3       (c)
p p p p
t t t t
p p p p
t t t t
p p p p
t t t t
% Q % A . % L . % K
% Q % A . % L . % K
% Q % A . % L . % K
   
   
   



    
    
    
                               (7) 
 
Columns (3), (4) and (5) of Table A5 show the series of potential output computed by applying (7) to 
the data. The series for potential output under the labels  and 
p p
t tQ Q  are much closed together. So, for 
minimizing possible controversies that may arise in relation to the index of capital input 
1
ˆ
tK   which de-
rives from Bitros (2019a), we shall narrow this assessment to  and 
p p
t tQ Q . Figure 3 displays the graphs of 
14 
 
these two series together with that of actual output tQ . Observe that throughout the period under consider-
ation the graph of the demand adjusted potential supply of output (
p
tQ  ) lies above that computed in the 
absence of such adjustment (
p
tQ ). What this finding implies is that above normal demand pressure on the 
fixed assets of firms shifts the potential supply of output upwards by leading to more intensive usage of 
the available capital stock as well as stirring up additional new investment. Or, stating the same inference 
in another way, gauging aggregate output supply in isolation from aggregate output demand results in an 
underestimation of potential output because in line with Summers’s intuition the “lack of demand creates 
its own lack of supply”.  
However, aside from their differences in the levels, observe that the curves  and p pt tQ Q  in Fig-
ure 3 differ also, albeit not widely, in their curvatures. The latter reflect the possible differences 
in the growth rates of the potential output from the two estimates. Thus, to highlight them we 
computed and in Figure 4 we present the 10 year    average growth rates from the two series. 
From them it turns out that with the exception of the period in the 1990s, allowing for the de-
mand pressure on the fixed assets of firms in the postwar period would have resulted in higher 
growth rates of the potential supply of output relative to those estimated by CBO. But otherwise 
one cannot fail to observe that by both estimates their downward long term trend remains intact. 
This transpires because, even though allowing for the impact of aggregate demand would lead to 
some improvement in the estimated growth rates of potential output, the aggregate demand has 
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not been sufficiently robust to reverse their downward trend. Rather on the contrary, as docu-
mented by the long term decline in the utilization rate, aggregate demand has been trending 
downwards throughout these decades because of its own strong headwinds. By all indications 
then the U.S. economy has entered into a prolonged period of secular stagnation due to economic 
growth retardants that operate through both aggregate supply and aggregate demand. For this rea-
son, in addition to the supply side headwinds, it is high time to identify and confront the forces 
that are reliable for the long term decline in aggregate demand. 
5. Summary of findings and conclusion 
CBO researchers estimate potential output by relying on the traditional Solow type growth ac-
counting approach. When they reckon the flow of capital services, they postulate that the poten-
tial use of such services is equal to their available supply, because “the potential flow of capital ser-
vices will always be related to the total size of the capital stock, not to the amount currently being used.” 
However, be this as it may, there is considerable literature establishing that the potential flow of capital 
services is not related to the total size of the capital stock but to that which is useable on rational entrepre-
neurial grounds. The introduction in the estimations of potential output of demand-side considerations via 
the utilization rate is based on this conceptualization.  
In particular, we derived two alternative measures of demand adjusted capital input for the U.S. non-
farm private business sector and compared their differential impacts on the potential supply of output rela-
tive to the unadjusted index of capital input published by CBO. The results from these comparisons 
showed that, allowing for the demand pressure on the fixed assets of firms, leads to three effects. It raises 
the levels of estimated potential output well above CBO’s estimates; with the exception of the 1990s, the 
estimated growth rates turn out to be higher than those computed by CBO; and, lastly, the long term trend 
of the growth rates with and without the demand adjustment of the capital input is sloping downwards. 
The latter finding was not unexpected because aggregate demand as reflected in the utilization rate of 
fixed assets by firms has been trending downwards throughout the postwar period.  
Drawing on these findings we conclude that the path to secular stagnation that the U.S. economy is fol-
lowing in the postwar period is not due solely to headwinds on the supply side. The deceleration in the 
expansion of productive capacity as well as in the intensity of its utilization cannot be explained in Isola-
tion to the trends that prevail in the aggregate demand. So it is high time that research economists turn 
their attention to and confront the headwinds that beset this side of the puzzle.  
 
 
16 
 
6. References 
Bitros, G. C., (2019a), “Potential output, capital input and U.S. economic growth,” 
https://www.dept.aueb.gr/sites/default/files/econ/dokimia/wp-03-2019-Bitros-
200419.pdf . 
Calvo, G., (1975), “Efﬁcient and optimal utilization of capital services,” American Economic Re-
view, 65, 181–186. 
Chatterjee, S., (2005), “Capital utilization, economic growth and convergence,” Journal of Eco-
nomic Dynamics & Control, 29, 2093–2124. 
Dutt, A. K., (2006), “Aggregate Demand, Aggregate Supply and Economic Growth,” Interna-
tional Review of Applied Economics, 20, 319–336.   
Dutt, A. K., (2010), “Reconciling the growth of aggregate demand and aggregate supply,” in M. 
Setterfield (ed.), Handbook of Alternative Theories of Economic Growth, 
Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 220–240. 
Dutt, A. K., Ross, J., (2007), “Aggregate demand shocks and economic growth,” Structural 
Change and Economic Dynamics, 18, 75–99. 
Fazzari, S. M., Ferri, P. E., Greenberg, E. G., Variato, A. M., (2013), “Aggregate demand, 
instability, and growth,” Review of Keynesian Economics, 1, 1–21. 
Ferri, P., Fazzari, S. M., Greenberg, E., Variato, A. M., (2011), “Aggregate demand, Harrod’s 
instability and fluctuations,” Computational Economics, 38, 209–220. 
Gordon, R. J., (2014), “US Economic Growth is Over: The Short Run meets the Long Run,” in THINK 
TANK 20: Growth, Convergence and Income Distribution: The Road from the Bris-
bane G-20 Summit, https://www.brookings.edu/.../2016/07/tt20-united-states-
economic-growth-gordon.pdf . 
-------------------, (2015), Beyond the Rainbow: The Rise and Fall of Growth in the American Standard of 
Living, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Harrod, R.F., (1939), “An essay in dynamic theory,” Economic Journal, 49, 14–33. 
Hulten, C.  R., (1986), “Productivity Change, Capacity Utilization, and the Sources of Efficiency 
Growth,” Journal of Econometrics, 33, 31–50. 
Kahn, R. F., (1959). "Exercises in the analysis of growth," Oxford Economic Papers, 11, 143-56. 
Kalecki, M., (1971), Selected Essays on the Dynamics of the Capitalist Economy, Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press. 
17 
 
Keynes, J. M., (1936), The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Robinson, J., (1962). Essays in the Theory of Economic Growth, London: Macmillan. 
Schultze, C. L., (1963), “Uses of Capacity Measures for Short-Run Economic Analysis,” Ameri-
can Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 53, 293–308. 
Shaikh, A., (2009), “Economic policy in a growth context: a classical synthesis of Keynes and 
Harrod,” Metroeconomica, 60, 455–494. 
Skott, P., Zipperer, B., (2012), “An empirical evaluation of three post-Keynesian models,” Inter-
vention: European Journal of Economics and Economic Policies, 9, 277–308. 
Summers, L. H., (2013), “IMF Fourteen Annual Research in Honor of Stanley Fisher,” in 
Http://larrysummers.com/imf-fourteen-annual-research-in-honor-of-stanley-fisher/. 
Summers, L. H., (2014), “U.S. Economic Prospects: Secular Stagnation, Hysteresis, and the Zero 
Lower Bound,” Business Economics, 49, 65-73. 
Wen, Y., (1998), “Capacity utilization under increasing returns to scale,” Journal of Economic 
Theory, 81, 7–36. 
18 
 
 
APPENDIX 
    Table A1: Actual data underlying CBO’s computations of potential GDP  
                                                      in the U.S nonfarm private business sector 
Year t
GDP Q
(1)  
tL  
(2)  
1tK   
(3) 
Labor  
productivity 
(4)=(1):(2) 
 Year t
GDP Q
 (1) 
tL  
(2) 
1tK   
(3) 
Labor 
productivity 
(4)=(1):(2) 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1,309 
1,441 
1,548 
1,595 
1,675 
1,650 
1,790 
1,823 
1,860 
1,823 
1,975 
2,010 
2,053 
2,194 
2,295 
2,448 
2,624 
2,812 
2,865 
3,018 
3,110 
3,105 
3,222 
3,438 
3,687 
3,631 
3,571 
3,826 
4,044 
4,312 
4,455 
4,415 
4,517 
4,373 
4,657 
5,047 
5,262 
83.4 
80.1 
82.7 
86.6 
87.5 
89.7 
86.7 
90.1 
92.4 
91.8 
88.0 
92.0 
92.6 
91.6 
93.6 
94.6 
98.7 
103.0 
103.7 
106.0 
109.3 
107.9 
107.3 
111.3 
115.9 
116.2 
111.4 
115.6 
120.0 
126.0 
130.3 
129.5 
130.9 
128.1 
130.3 
138.1 
142.0 
11.8 
12.1 
12.6 
13.0 
13.5 
13.9 
14.3 
14.8 
15.3 
15.8 
16.2 
16.7 
17.2 
17.9 
18.5 
19.2 
20.0 
21.1 
22.3 
23.4 
24.5 
25.6 
26.7 
27.7 
29.0 
30.4 
31.6 
32.4 
33.3 
34.5 
35.9 
37.4 
38.9 
40.3 
41.6 
42.9 
44.8 
15.7 
16.2 
16.8 
17.4 
17.9 
18.2 
18.5 
18.8 
19.3 
19.8 
20.3 
20.8 
21.4 
22.0 
22.6 
23.2 
23.9 
24.8 
25.7 
26.5 
27.3 
28.0 
28.5 
28.9 
29.4 
29.9 
30.4 
30.8 
31.2 
31.7 
32.2 
32.3 
32.3 
32.7 
33.2 
33.7 
34.4 
 1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
2014 
2015 
2016 
5,463 
5,658 
5,916 
6,134 
6,228 
6,191 
6,442 
6,642 
6,950 
7,191 
7,516 
7,909 
8,325 
8,789 
9,173 
9,240 
9,404 
9,697 
10,131 
10,513 
10,848 
11,097 
10,954 
10,488 
10,823 
11,061 
11,406 
11,633 
12,015 
12,426 
12,611 
143.4 
148.0 
152.4 
157.2 
157.3 
154.3 
154.7 
158.8 
165.3 
169.6 
173.4 
179.2 
184.1 
188.1 
191.3 
188.4 
184.8 
183.2 
185.6 
188.9 
193.1 
195.1 
192.7 
180.2 
180.4 
184.8 
188.8 
192.5 
196.9 
201.3 
204.6 
46.6 
48.3 
49.9 
51.5 
53.2 
54.6 
55.8 
57.1 
58.7 
60.6 
62.9 
65.6 
68.8 
72.5 
76.5 
80.3 
83.2 
85.2 
87.1 
89.2 
91.7 
94.5 
97.3 
99.3 
100.0 
100.8 
102.2 
104.0 
105.9 
108.0 
110.3 
35.1 
35.8 
36.5 
37.3 
38.0 
38.6 
39.1 
39.6 
40.2 
40.7 
41.5 
42.6 
44.0 
45.5 
47.2 
48.8 
50.3 
51.5 
52.9 
54.1 
55.2 
56.2 
57.1 
57.9 
58.4 
58.9 
59.5 
60.2 
60.8 
61.6 
62.4 
Notes 
1. Actual GDP in billions of chained 2009 dollars. 
2. Actual hours worked, billions of hours. Data from 1964 to 2016 from U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), Division of 
Major Sector Productivity, August 18, 2017. Data for 1949 to 1963, computed backwards using the percentages of annual 
change from BLS series PRS85006032. 
3. Capital Services, index: 2009 = 100, lagged one year. 
Source: CBO's June 2017 report: An Update to the Budget and Economic Outlook: 2017 to 2027, 
www.cbo.gov/publication/52801 
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Table A2: Historical and projected potential values of GDP and its 
                                                  determinants in the U.S nonfarm private business sector 
 
Year 
P p
t tGDP Q
(1)  
P
tL  
(2)  
1 1
p
t t
K K
 

(3) 
P
tA   
(4) 
 Year 
P
tGDP  
(1) 
P
tL  
(2) 
1 1
p
t t
K K
 

(3) 
P
tA  
(4) 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1,341 
1,412 
1,481 
1,558 
1,629 
1,680 
1,722 
1,768 
1,823 
1,891 
1,962 
2,041 
2,123 
2,210 
2,309 
2,412 
2,520 
2,637 
2,769 
2,906 
3,041 
3,160 
3,271 
3,387 
3,508 
3,653 
3,806 
3,945 
4,086 
4,241 
4,399 
4,516 
4,620 
4,773 
4,944 
5,129 
5,336 
5,548 
5,753 
5,949 
85.5 
87.2 
88.1 
89.3 
91.1 
92.3 
93.1 
93.9 
94.7 
95.6 
96.8 
98.1 
99.3 
100.5 
102.2 
103.9 
105.3 
106.5 
107.8 
109.5 
111.2 
112.9 
114.9 
117.3 
119.4 
122.0 
125.0 
128.0 
130.9 
133.7 
136.6 
139.8 
143.0 
146.1 
149.1 
152.2 
155.2 
158.0 
160.7 
162.9 
11.8 
12.1 
12.6 
13.0 
13.5 
13.9 
14.3 
14.8 
15.3 
15.8 
16.2 
16.7 
17.2 
17.9 
18.5 
19.2 
20.0 
21.1 
22.3 
23.4 
24.5 
25.6 
26.7 
27.7 
29.0 
30.4 
31.6 
32.4 
33.3 
34.5 
35.9 
37.4 
38.9 
40.3 
41.6 
42.9 
44.8 
46.6 
48.3 
49.9 
46.4 
47.8 
49.1 
50.5 
51.5 
52.1 
52.6 
53.1 
53.8 
54.9 
56.1 
57.4 
58.6 
59.9 
61.2 
62.5 
63.8 
65.2 
66.6 
68.1 
69.4 
70.3 
70.9 
71.6 
72.3 
73.2 
74.2 
75.2 
76.3 
77.3 
78.2 
78.1 
77.8 
78.4 
79.4 
80.5 
81.5 
82.6 
83.7 
84.8 
 1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
2014 
2015 
2016 
2017 
2018 
2019 
2020 
2021 
2022 
2023 
2024 
2025 
2026 
2027 
6,142 
6,332 
6,508 
6,680 
6,869 
7,080 
7,313 
7,564 
7,871 
8,242 
8,639 
9,035 
9,415 
9,737 
10,015 
10,290 
10,569 
10,809 
11,016 
11,226 
11,405 
11,525 
11,657 
11,829 
12,033 
12,257 
12,492 
12,719 
12,943 
13,191 
13,459 
13,740 
14,033 
14,339 
14,655 
14,977 
15,306 
15,642 
15,986 
164.7 
166.5 
168.4 
170.7 
173.4 
176.3 
179.6 
182.4 
184.9 
187.4 
189.7 
191.3 
192.8 
193.8 
194.3 
194.7 
195.2 
195.7 
196.0 
196.5 
197.1 
197.4 
197.9 
198.8 
200.0 
201.4 
202.9 
203.9 
204.6 
205.4 
206.2 
207.0 
207.8 
208.6 
209.5 
210.4 
211.3 
212.2 
213.0 
51.5 
53.2 
54.6 
55.8 
57.1 
58.7 
60.6 
62.9 
65.6 
68.8 
72.5 
76.5 
80.3 
83.2 
85.2 
87.1 
89.2 
91.7 
94.5 
97.3 
99.3 
100.0 
100.8 
102.2 
104.0 
105.9 
108.0 
110.3 
112.6 
115.0 
117.7 
120.4 
123.0 
125.6 
128.3 
130.9 
133.7 
136.5 
139.4 
85.9 
86.9 
87.8 
88.7 
89.5 
90.4 
91.3 
92.3 
93.9 
95.8 
97.9 
100.0 
102.0 
103.9 
105.9 
107.9 
109.8 
111.1 
111.9 
112.7 
113.5 
114.3 
115.1 
115.9 
116.7 
117.5 
118.3 
119.2 
120.1 
121.1 
122.3 
123.5 
124.9 
126.3 
127.8 
129.3 
130.9 
132.4 
134.0 
Notes 
1. Potential GDP in billions of chained 2009 dollars. 
2. Potential hours worked in billions of hours.  
3. Cyclically unadjusted capital Services, index: 2009 = 100, lagged one year. Hence, 1 1
P
t tK K  . 
4. Potential Total Factor Productivity, index: 2000 = 100 
Source: CBO's June 2017 report: An Update to the Budget and Economic Outlook: 2017 to 2027,  
www.cbo.gov/publication/52801 
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Table A3: Indices of capacity utilization and relative demand pressure 
                                          
Years t
tcu
(1) 
tmcu
(2) 
tu  
(3) 
trdp  
(4) 
 Years t
tcu
(1) 
tmcu
(2) 
tu  
(3) 
trdp  
(4)   
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
87.00 
87.34 
87.40 
81.22 
79.58 
84.63 
88.27 
85.13 
75.80 
79.80 
83.44 
85.12 
85.05 
80.81 
79.58 
73.59 
74.88 
80.40 
79.20 
78.60 
 
82.81 
85.83 
85.35 
89.25 
80.11 
86.98 
86.14 
83.61 
75.02 
81.63 
80.14 
77.31 
81.43 
83.46 
85.65 
89.54 
91.13 
87.16 
87.08 
86.63 
79.42 
77.90 
83.37 
87.65 
84.46 
73.69 
78.34 
82.49 
84.41 
84.08 
78.72 
76.94 
70.89 
73.46 
79.32 
78.11 
78.40 
 
83.70 
86.31 
85.89 
89.26 
81.38 
87.30 
86.58 
84.39 
76.99 
82.69 
81.40 
78.96 
82.51 
84.26 
86.15 
89.51 
90.88 
87.00 
87.34 
87.40 
81.22 
79.58 
84.63 
88.27 
85.13 
75.80 
79.80 
83.44 
85.12 
85.05 
80.81 
79.58 
73.59 
74.88 
80.40 
79.20 
78.60 
 
1.057 
1.089 
1.086 
1.129 
1.039 
1.109 
1.102 
1.078 
1.000 
1.062 
1.050 
1.025 
1.066 
1.088 
1.113 
1.159 
1.180 
1.130 
1.137 
1.139 
1.066 
1.050 
1.111 
1.160 
1.121 
1.017 
1.062 
1.106 
1.129 
1.131 
1.081 
1.068 
1.006 
1.021 
1.084 
1.072 
1.067 
 
 1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
2014 
2015 
2016 
81.16 
84.30 
83.77 
82.48 
79.90 
80.49 
81.44 
83.48 
83.93 
83.33 
84.04 
82.71 
81.70 
81.41 
76.12 
74.99 
75.98 
78.10 
79.99 
80.38 
80.67 
77.72 
68.52 
73.57 
76.28 
77.18 
77.32 
78.64 
76.83 
75.75 
76.52 
80.97 
84.03 
83.30 
81.64 
78.55 
79.53 
80.41 
82.73 
83.13 
82.11 
82.99 
81.50 
80.43 
79.67 
73.76 
73.06 
73.98 
76.40 
78.31 
78.60 
78.82 
74.67 
65.54 
70.72 
73.66 
74.85 
74.68 
75.40 
75.53 
75.11 
75.67 
81.16 
84.30 
83.77 
82.48 
79.90 
80.49 
81.44 
83.48 
83.93 
83.33 
84.04 
82.71 
81.70 
81.41 
76.12 
74.99 
75.98 
78.10 
79.99 
80.38 
80.67 
77.72 
68.52 
73.57 
76.28 
77.18 
77.32 
78.64 
76.83 
75.75 
76.52 
1.099 
1.140 
1.135 
1.121 
1.092 
1.101 
1.114 
1.142 
1.151 
1.145 
1.156 
1.141 
1.130 
1.129 
1.067 
1.056 
1.069 
1.096 
1.121 
1.128 
1.134 
1.099 
1.000 
1.055 
1.088 
1.101 
1.105 
1.123 
1.103 
1.092 
1.103 
Notes 
1. Total capacity utilization in column (1) corresponds to the time series CAPUTLB50001SQ 
from the database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St’ Louis.  
2. Manufacturing capacity utilization in column (2) corresponds to the time series CA-
PUTLB00004SQ from the database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St’ Louis. 
Capacity utilization index obtained as explained in the text.  
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Table A4: Alternative estimates of the demand adjusted potential capital input 
                                            in the U.S nonfarm private business sector
1
 
 
Years 1 1
p
t t
K K
 

(1) 
1
ˆ
tK   
(2) 
trdp  
(3) 
1
p
tK    
(4) 
1
p
tK   
(5) 
 Years 1t
K 
(1) 
1
ˆ
tK   
(2) 
trdp  
(3) 
1
p
tK    
(4) 
1
p
tK   
(5) 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
 
11.8 
12.1 
12.6 
13.0 
13.5 
13.9 
14.3 
14.8 
15.3 
15.8 
16.2 
16.7 
17.2 
17.9 
18.5 
19.2 
20.0 
21.1 
22.3 
23.4 
24.5 
25.6 
26.7 
27.7 
29.0 
30.4 
31.6 
32.4 
33.3 
34.5 
35.9 
37.4 
38.9 
40.3 
41.6 
42.9 
44.8 
 
10.2 
10.4 
10.7 
10.9 
11.1 
11.5 
11.8 
12.1 
12.6 
13.0 
13.3 
13.6 
13.9 
14.2 
14.7 
15.2 
15.8 
16.6 
17.5 
18.3 
19.1 
20.0 
20.6 
21.3 
22.1 
23.1 
24.1 
24.6 
25.3 
26.3 
27.5 
29.0 
30.4 
31.9 
33.3 
34.6 
36.7 
 
1.057 
1.089 
1.086 
1.129 
1.039 
1.109 
1.102 
1.078 
1.000 
1.062 
1.050 
1.025 
1.066 
1.088 
1.113 
1.159 
1.180 
1.130 
1.137 
1.139 
1.066 
1.050 
1.111 
1.160 
1.121 
1.017 
1.062 
1.106 
1.129 
1.131 
1.081 
1.068 
1.006 
1.021 
1.084 
1.072 
1.067 
 
13.9 
14.2 
14.4 
14.5 
14.7 
15.2 
15.6 
16.0 
16.5 
17.2 
17.9 
18.6 
19.4 
20.4 
21.4 
22.3 
23.3 
24.4 
25.7 
26.9 
27.8 
28.8 
30.0 
31.2 
32.4 
33.7 
35.0 
35.9 
36.8 
38.1 
39.6 
41.0 
42.6 
44.3 
46.1 
48.0 
49.8 
 
11.7 
11.9 
12.0 
12.1 
12.3 
12.6 
12.9 
13.2 
13.5 
14.0 
14.5 
15.0 
15.6 
16.3 
17.0 
17.7 
18.4 
19.2 
20.1 
20.9 
21.5 
22.2 
23.1 
23.9 
24.8 
25.8 
26.8 
27.5 
28.3 
29.5 
30.8 
32.2 
33.7 
35.5 
37.4 
39.4 
41.4 
 1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
2014 
2015 
2016 
46.6 
48.3 
49.9 
51.5 
53.2 
54.6 
55.8 
57.1 
58.7 
60.6 
62.9 
65.6 
68.8 
72.5 
76.5 
80.3 
83.2 
85.2 
87.1 
89.2 
91.7 
94.5 
97.3 
99.3 
100.0 
100.8 
102.2 
104.0 
105.9 
108.0 
110.3 
38.9 
40.9 
42.7 
44.5 
46.6 
48.5 
49.9 
51.5 
53.3 
55.5 
58.1 
61.0 
64.3 
68.0 
72.2 
76.5 
79.7 
81.7 
83.6 
86.0 
89.1 
92.6 
96.4 
99.5 
100.0 
101.4 
103.5 
106.2 
109.0 
112.3 
115.6 
1.099 
1.140 
1.135 
1.121 
1.092 
1.101 
1.114 
1.142 
1.151 
1.145 
1.156 
1.141 
1.130 
1.129 
1.067 
1.056 
1.069 
1.096 
1.121 
1.128 
1.134 
1.099 
1.000 
1.055 
1.088 
1.101 
1.105 
1.123 
1.103 
1.092 
1.103 
51.9.
54.0 
56.0 
58.2 
60.3 
62.5 
64.4 
66.6 
69.0 
71.3 
73.8 
76.5 
79.3 
82.3 
85.4 
88.5 
91.4 
93.4 
95.7 
98.4 
101.0 
103.4 
105.8 
107.7 
109.4 
111.2 
112.0 
113.8 
115.1 
116.2 
117.2 
43.7 
46.0 
48.3 
50.7 
53.1 
55.6 
57.9 
60.3 
63.0 
65.6 
68.3 
71.3 
74.4 
77.6 
81.0 
84.3 
87.6 
89.9 
92.8 
95.9 
99.0 
101.9 
104.9 
107.5 
110.1 
112.7 
114.0 
116.2 
117.8 
119.2 
120.8 
Notes 
1. Capital input in column (1)  as reported by CBO (see Table A1 and A2 above)  
2. Capital input in column (2) from Bitros (2017). Computed to allow for compositional and other changes in 
the capital stock in the U.S nonfarm private business sector.  
3. Index of relative demand pressure on the fixed assets of firms derived as explained in the text.  
4. Five year centered moving average of the capital input derived by multiplying columns (3) and (1). 
5. Five year centered moving average of the capital input derived by multiplying columns (3) and (2) 
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Table A5: Potential output under alternative demand adjusted estimates of potential  
                 capital input in the U.S nonfarm private business sector
 
 
 
Years t
Q  
(1) 
p
tQ  
(2) 
p
tQ  
(3) 
1
p
tQ    
(4) 
1
p
tQ   
(5) 
 Years 
 tQ  
(1) 
p
tQ  
(2) 
p
tQ  
(3) 
1
p
tQ    
(4) 
1
p
tQ   
(5) 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
 
1,309 
1,441 
1,548 
1,595 
1,675 
1,650 
1,790 
1,823 
1,860 
1,823 
1,975 
2,010 
2,053 
2,194 
2,295 
2,448 
2,624 
2,812 
2,865 
3,018 
3,110 
3,105 
3,222 
3,438 
3,687 
3,631 
3,571 
3,826 
4,044 
4,312 
4,455 
4,415 
4,517 
4,373 
4,657 
5,047 
5,262 
1,341 
1,412 
1,481 
1,558 
1,629 
1,680 
1,722 
1,768 
1,823 
1,891 
1,962 
2,041 
2,123 
2,210 
2,309 
2,412 
2,520 
2,637 
2,769 
2,906 
3,041 
3,160 
3,271 
3,387 
3,508 
3,653 
3,806 
3,945 
4,086 
4,241 
4,399 
4,516 
4,620 
4,773 
4,944 
5,129 
5,336 
 
1,341 
1,410 
1,476 
1,547 
1,617 
1,665 
1,705 
1,750 
1,801 
1,868 
1,939 
2,020 
2,098 
2,188 
2,283 
2,384 
2,486 
2,601 
2,724 
2,855 
2,981 
3,092 
3,197 
3,311 
3,431 
3,576 
3,729 
3,870 
4,020 
4,177 
4,339 
4,459 
4,567 
4,721 
4,895 
5,080 
5,281 
 
1,386 
1,447 
1,518 
1,581 
1,655 
1,719 
1,792 
1,848 
1,897 
1,970 
2,041 
2,139 
2,222 
2,325 
2,435 
2,561 
2,664 
2,776 
2,901 
3,022 
3,142 
3,259 
3,379 
3,506 
3,636 
3,779 
3,934 
4,075 
4,219 
4,355 
4,497 
4,662 
4,844 
5,027 
5,199 
5,377 
5,551 
1,374 
1,436 
1,509 
1,574 
1,650 
1,714 
1,787 
1,843 
1,891 
1,965 
2,035 
2,133 
2,215 
2,318 
2,427 
2,552 
2,657 
2,768 
2,894 
3,013 
3,134 
3,251 
3,371 
3,498 
3,628 
3,773 
3,929 
4,073 
4,219 
4,359 
4,503 
4,670 
4,857 
5,045 
5,219 
5,400 
5,574 
 
 1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
2014 
2015 
2016 
5,463 
5,658 
5,916 
6,134 
6,228 
6,191 
6,442 
6,642 
6,950 
7,191 
7,516 
7,909 
8,325 
8,789 
9,173 
9,240 
9,404 
9,697 
10,131 
10,513 
10,848 
11,097 
10,954 
10,488 
10,823 
11,061 
11,406 
11,633 
12,015 
12,426 
12,611 
5,548 
5,753 
5,949 
6,142 
6,332 
6,508 
6,680 
6,869 
7,080 
7,313 
7,564 
7,871 
8,242 
8,639 
9,035 
9,415 
9,737 
10,015 
10,290 
10,569 
10,809 
11,016 
11,226 
11,405 
11,525 
11,657 
11,829 
12,033 
12,257 
12,492 
12,719 
5,482 
5,681 
5,866 
6,044 
6,221 
6,384 
6,553 
6,730 
6,933 
7,160 
7,398 
7,693 
8,034 
8,409 
8,778 
9,132 
9,435 
9,701 
9,963 
10,229 
10,454 
10,637 
10,826 
10,993 
11,105 
11,229 
11,390 
11,577 
11,776 
11,988 
12,197 
5,746 
5,928 
6,131 
6,316 
6,485 
6,657 
6,838 
7,058 
7,300 
7,568 
7,845 
8,132 
8,421 
8,737 
9,053 
9,381 
9,684 
9,942 
10,206 
10,447 
10,673 
10,880 
11,090 
11,262 
11,413 
11,574 
11,708 
11,875 
12,020 
12,205 
12,345 
5,771 
5,951 
6,154 
6,338 
6,505 
6,674 
6,855 
7,073 
7,314 
7,580 
7,856 
8,144 
8,431 
8,745 
9,060 
9,388 
9,691 
9,951 
10,218 
10,455 
10,681 
10,889 
11,101 
11,276 
11,429 
11,591 
11,711 
11,861 
11,989 
12,162 
12,286 
Notes 
1. Actual historical values of output reported by CBO (see Table A1)  
2. Potential output reported by CBO (see Table A2)  
3. Potential output computed from equation (7a) 
4. Potential output computed from equation (7b) 
5. Potential output computed from equation (7c) 
